Counterfeit prevention is a major concern for central banks. In search of effective policy measures, it is often claimed that a clean banknote circulation helps the general public to more easily detect counterfeits. To examine this claim, we conducted an experimental study with 250 consumers and 261 cashiers in the Netherlands and Germany. Participants received 200 banknotes with either a high or a low average soil level. The banknote test sets contained 20 counterfeits to be detected by the participants. For the regression analysis we applied approaches used in the area of psychophysical science (signal detection theory). Our candidates identified more counterfeits when sorting clean banknotes. However, our analysis also showed that the cleanliness of banknotes does not actually help the person checking the banknote to more easily distinguish a counterfeit banknote from a genuine note. In fact, new and clean banknotes raised suspicion: they were more often declared as counterfeitscorrectly or not. We discuss the implication of our results for central banks' banknote policies.
Introduction
Counterfeit prevention is high on the political agenda of every central bank. For the individual, inadvertently accepting counterfeit banknotes or coins can lead to a considerable financial loss, as counterfeits are not reimbursed. At the national level, elevated counterfeiting rates can jeopardise confidence in a currency. In search of effective policy measures, it is often claimed that a high quality of the banknotes in circulationi. e. clean and undamaged banknoteshelps the public to more easily detect counterfeits (ECB 2010) . To asses this claim, we conducted an experimental study with 250 consumers and 261 cashiers in the Netherlands and Germany. During the experiments, we tested whether candidates were better at identifying counterfeit banknotes if they were hidden in stacks of clean banknotes or in stacks of soiled banknotes. The counterfeit banknotes themselves were drawn from actual circulation and exhibited an average soil level. The study was jointly carried out by De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and the Deutsche Bundesbank (DBB), with the help of the VU University Amsterdam.
The national central banks (NCBs) of the Eurosystem aim to ensure a consistently high quality of the euro banknotes in circulation. That is to say, banknotes must not be soiled, creased, limp or torn. In particular, banknotes must be clean enough so that they are acceptable to consumers and retailers as a payment instrument and can be used in banknote accepting devices, such as automated teller machines and vending machines. Furthermore, a clean banknote circulation is intended to inspire confidence in the euro as a currency in general. To this end, the national central banks of the Eurosystem have agreed upon minimum quality standards for banknote sorting. In practice, NCBs differ in terms of their sorting polices, which is one of the reasons why the quality of circulation differs between the various euro area countries. Some NCBs increase the minimum requirements for the cleanliness of banknotes by adding a 'counterfeiting factor'. Those in favour of high sorting standards argue that counterfeits are easier to detect in a clean circulation as security features are more clearly visible. 1 Those who argue against it claim that replacing more soiled banknotes with new ones raises the costs for central banks, while the effectiveness of the measure is still uncertain.
Scientific research on factors that can facilitate the detection of counterfeits by the general public is very scarce. The most comprehensive analysis is perhaps that of Jonker et al. (2006) , who conducted an economic experiment with 164 cashiers and 40 consumers. However, the authors did not take the cleanliness of banknotes into account in their study. The main research question is whether the DNB training materials and technical aids, such as UV lights and IR cameras, are helpful in facilitating the detection of counterfeits. Candidates were asked to check a set of 220 euro banknotes and to sort out any counterfeits. The use of learning materials substantially improved the detection rate of consumers, while it had no effect on the performance of cashiers. Technical identification aids, by contrast, did not improve detection rates.
To the best of our knowledge, the only published study that also incorporates the cleanliness of banknotes as an explanatory factor is that of Klein et al. (2004) . Commissioned by the Bank of Canada, the study focuses on the Canadian dollar. During the experimental tests, 158 consumers and cashiers were asked to examine a series of banknotes for a period of just a few seconds each. The banknotes comprised both genuine and counterfeit banknotes and varied in terms of cleanliness. In the empirical analysis, the authors look at both the quality of the individual note and the quality of the surrounding notes. For individual notes, they find that counterfeits are best detected when they are clean. However, the quality of the surrounding notes has no impact on counterfeit detection.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we study the relationship between banknote cleanliness and counterfeit detection in the case of the euro currency. As Canadian dollar and euro banknotes differ in terms of their design, material and security features, the results of Klein et al. (2004) do not necessarily apply to euro banknotes. With more than 18 billion notes in circulation, the euro banknote is one of the most widely used paper currencies in the world. Owing to sophisticated printing technology and high security standards, counterfeiting rates in the euro area are low compared to other currency areas (European Central Bank 2015a). However, there are regional differences. For countries with higher rates, it might be interesting to find out whether raising the sorting standards of banknotes would be an effective counterfeit prevention measure.
Second, we are not only interested in whether banknote cleanliness affects counterfeit detection rates but also in how it achieves this. Security features of clean banknotes might be easier to recognise. This should enhance the testees' ability to distinguish between genuine and counterfeit banknotes and should enable them to sort more accurately. However, the level of cleanliness might also determine how sceptically users view their banknotes. Worn banknotes have already been used and checked by many people and might inspire more confidence than new ones.
Besides, counterfeits are known to be rather clean, as counterfeiters probably do not deliberately soil their products. 2 If the participants in our tests are very sceptical towards clean banknotes, they will classify a relatively large number of them as being counterfeits. As a result, they will detect most of the counterfeits (hits) but also incorrectly classify many genuine notes (false alarms). In real life, such behaviour increases the public cost of banknote checking: people are inclined to check banknotes in greater detail, but in vain. If people are in fact more sceptical towards new banknotes, higher sorting standards would increase counterfeit detection rates, but would also lead to more meticulous authenticity checks. In this case, conclusions for a central bank's counterfeiting policy must be drawn more carefully.
In order to distinguish between sorting accuracy and suspicion among our testees, we rely on two concepts from signal detection theory: sensitivity and bias (Stanislaw/Todorov 1999) . In our context, sensitivity refers to how easy or difficult it is to distinguish between counterfeit and genuine notes. Bias, on the other hand, is the extent to which a candidate is inclined to call a banknote a counterfeit. These measures have been applied in psychophysical science for decades but are hardly known within the sphere of economic research. Yet they could provide new perspectives for the analysis of economic experiments as well. In our study, they efficiently combine information on both hits and false alarms and allow for a more profound analysis of the testees' performance.
Conducting a regression analysis, we find that candidates detect significantly more counterfeits when their test sets are clean (higher detection rate).
Repeating the regression with a sensitivity measure as an outcome variable, we find that a clean test set did not specifically help testees to distinguish between genuine and counterfeit banknotes. In fact, the testees simply became more careful and sorted out more banknotes as being counterfeits (stronger bias).
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental setting and the data collection. Section 3 presents the strategy of our empirical analysis. In Section 4 we describe our sample and report summary statistics before presenting our results in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 discusses the implications of our results for central banks' counterfeiting policy and sorting standards.
The experiment 2.1 Recruitment of participants
The target group in our study consisted of cashiers and consumers from Germany and the Netherlands. The field work was conducted between June 2014 and August 2015 and took place in the areas of Frankfurt and Amsterdam. In order to obtain a representative sample of consumers, we personally invited passersby in various locations, such as at city halls, open days at both NCBs, visitor centres, shopping precincts, community centres, various courses and public events, etc. Of the participating cashiers, the majority worked on the checkouts of large supermarkets, but some of them were shopkeepers in high streets. We explained to all participants that the tests were part of a scientific study on counterfeit detection conducted by the Dutch and the German central banks. We made it clear that participation was voluntary and that the results would be treated anonymously. Participating cashiers were assured that their individual results and the results of their store would not be passed on to the management.
Participants did not receive any monetary remuneration due to budgetary constraints. However, as counterfeits are an interesting topic, most of the candidates were happy to participate anyway. After finishing the test, they were asked to choose a small gift from a give-away collection, consisting of USB sticks, ballpoint pens or similar. We also offered to provide the participants with counterfeit training after the test to help them to more easily and reliably check the security features of euro banknotes and we also handed out information material.
Test sets
The participants' task during the tests was to sort a set of 200 banknotes. Altogether, we created eight sets of banknotes with equal characteristics, except for the level of cleanliness. All sets consisted of 180 genuine notes and 20 counterfeits. Both the DBB and the DNB were supplied with two sets of high quality and two sets of low quality banknotes.
We restricted the total number of banknotes in each set to 200 in order to avoid tiredness and boredom among participants. When determining the ratio between genuine notes and counterfeits we had to consider two opposing aspects: the probability of encountering a counterfeit in real life is very low which calls for a very low percentage of counterfeits in the test sets. 3 However, there are several classes of counterfeits that might all be perceived differently by the participants. In order to have a representative sample of counterfeits, a reasonably large number of fake banknotes was required. In the end, we decided on a share of 10 % counterfeits (20 per stack of 200) as a compromise. Each test set consisted of equal numbers of EUR 20 and EUR 50 notesboth genuine and counterfeit. These denominations were chosen becauseaccording to an ECB press release issued on 17 July 2015these denominations account for 86 % of all counterfeits found in circulation in the Eurosystem.
All the counterfeit notes we used in the test sets are frequently found in the Eurosystem, and they were retrieved from actual circulation. They varied in terms of professionalism, but overall, they were quite deceptive. Furthermore, all of the selected counterfeit notes were, at that time, part of the Eurosystem test set used for assessing banknote handling machines and therefore represent the majority of counterfeits in circulation. We aimed to have an equal average soil level of the counterfeit notes in both the clean and the less clean sets. This is because we assumed that counterfeiters do not deliberately deteriorate their products to mimic the quality of banknotes in circulation. This assumption is partly based on the experience of central banks' counterfeiting experts and partly on the fact that the soil level of detected counterfeits is similar throughout the euro area, even though the average quality of banknotes in circulation varies. The soil level of the counterfeits was chosen so that they were not obviously different from genuine clean or less clean notes.
Counterfeits and genuine notes were randomly mixed in each test set so that the order of the banknotes would be different across the sets. After that, the banknotes of each test set were numbered (1-200) so that their order within the sets would remain unchanged during the tests.
Soil distribution
According to the general public, central banks do a good job of keeping the quality of the banknotes in circulation at a high level. For the euro area, the results of the ECB's online survey on the quality of euro banknotes in circulation (European Central Bank 2015b) show that citizens consider the physical condition of the EUR 50 notes in circulation to be very high: 69 % consider them to be in a good or excellent condition, and 20 % believe they are in an acceptable condition. 4 To establish a meaningful difference between the clean and the less clean sets, we looked at a Eurosystem internal quality survey from 2013. This survey measures the quality of the banknotes in circulation per country (sample size: 20,000), expressed in a scale of soil levels from 0 to 100. Typically, the distribution of the soil level is skewed: there are a large number of relatively clean notes, with a small number of dirty ones. Figure 1 shows the actual difference 4 Several studies show that both the Dutch and the German public are even more satisfied with the present banknote quality than the average European citizen. According to a representative survey of the Dutch population, 83 % of Dutch people state that euro banknotes in general are fairly clean or very clean. With regard to the EUR 50 banknote, as many as 88 % of respondents are of this opinion (Randsdorp/Zondervan 2015: 13) . A representative survey of the German Counterfeit Detection between a country with a relatively clean circulation and a country with a less clean circulation.
To prepare the test sets, we considered the difference between a country C with a relatively clean circulation and a country LC with a relatively less clean circulation as a basis for the difference between the clean and less clean sets. In practice, the clean test set was based on the real-life average of the distributions of EUR 20 and EUR 50 banknotes in country C, whereas the less clean test set was based on the distribution of the EUR 20 note in country LC, which is the more soiled denomination. By adopting this approach, we achieved a mean less clean soil level (33.8) which was somewhat more than twice the mean of the clean distribution (15.9). The actual circulation in both Germany and the Netherlands lies in between these extreme values. The soil level distribution of counterfeits was similar in all eight test sets. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the soil level distribution within the test sets on a scale from 1 to 16, which is linearly related to the scale of 1 to 100 from the quality survey.
To monitor the level of cleanliness before, during and after the tests, some test sets were analysed using Brain 2 technology (Balke et al. 2012 ). This technology is a quick and reliable means of quality scoring used to decide, for example, population (Deutsche Bundesbank 2015) draws a similar picture. 87 % of German respondents state that they are satisfied or fairly satisfied with the quality of euro banknotes (e. g. their cleanliness and intactness). The same study also finds that the majority of the German population (58 %) would not agree to a reduction in banknote quality, even if this were to reduce the cost to the public. whether a banknote that was paid in at a central bank is still suitable for recirculation in terms of cleanliness and possible damages (fitness). It makes use of a self-learning algorithm to determine the fitness probability of a banknote. The Brain 2 fitness detector enabled us to keep track of the average fitness level of the test sets. The assumption was that the banknotes decrease in cleanliness level simply by being used for testing, but the average difference between the clean and less clean sets will remain constant, as they are tested an equal number of times. This assumption appeared to be fairly accurate. Based on measurements of a sample, the Brain 2 fitness score of less clean notes appeared to deteriorate slightly more (decrease in average fitness probability: 15 %) than the score of clean notes (12 %). The percentage distance between the average fitness probability of clean and less clean sets according to Brain 2 remained very clear both before the testing (15 %) and after the testing (19 %).
Test setting
The tests took place right after the participants were contacted. Consumers were invited into a special room to take the tests, whereas cashiers took the test in the back office of their workplace during working hours. Test conditions, e. g. lighting conditions, were fairly similar, but this could not be controlled for practical reasons.
Seated at a table, the participants were asked to separate their test sets consisting of 200 banknotes into genuine and counterfeit notes. They were told that their sets consisted of mostly genuine notes, but that there was at least Counterfeit Detection one counterfeit in each stack. The banknotes were offered in five consecutive stacks of 40 notes to each participant in the same random order. The time taken to check each stack of notes was measured using a stopwatch. The reason for not presenting all 200 notes at once was to avoid boredom and to allow participants to take a break after each stack. This was also achieved by allowing a short period of time to note down the counterfeits and the time taken. Despite the fact that the time was recorded, we emphasised to the participants that they should take as much time as they needed, as it was not a competition.
As each central bank disposed of four test sets of banknotes, the tests were mostly conducted in groups of four. In the case of cashiers, the number of participants was sometimes lower, depending on the number of cashiers available in the respective branch. To prevent cheating, each test set was unique with regard to the respective order of the notes. Furthermore, participants were instructed not to pay any attention to others and they were also supervised by the test leaders (at least two test leaders in a test with four participants). We also explained to participants that the results of their peers had nothing to do with their own performance.
Participants were not rewarded for a good test result. However, as most participants were interested in learning about their own counterfeit recognition skills, they were very keen to correctly sort the banknotes into two piles.
After the test, participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire, which included questions on sociodemographic factors. Furthermore, they were asked to write down the security features they had checked. A sample questionnaire can be found in the electronic appendix (A).
Sample size
The aim of the study is to obtain meaningful results for both consumers and cashiers with a statistical power level of 0.8 and a probability level of 0.05. A pilot of 40 candidates yielded a Cohen's d of 0.32 (based on mean differences and standard deviations of the hit rates comparing candidates with clean and less clean sets). This converted into a minimum sample size per group of 122 or 244 in total (one-tailed). 5 In the end, we managed to find more than the necessary minimum number of participants. Our results are based on data gathered from 511 participants -250 consumers and 261 cashiers.
External validity
The external validity of experimental data is always open to debate. Our study also has some weak points, which require the results to be interpreted carefully.
First, participants were aware of the fact that there would be some counterfeits among the banknotes and that they should look for them. In real life, however, people might not think of the possibility of receiving counterfeit money in a transaction. This is true to a large extent for consumers and to a lesser extent for cashiers. According to the data gathered in our questionnaire, only 14 % of consumers and 81 % of cashiers had checked banknotes for authenticity during the last six months. Most participants in the test might thus have looked more closely and more critically at banknotes than they would have done in real life. As a consequence, the test results must not be interpreted as the probability of a counterfeit being detected in real life. However, as participants probably took a closer look at both the clean and the less clean test sets we still believe that the difference between the two can be interpreted in a sensible way.
Second, the tests were typically performed by four participants at a time. There is empirical evidence that peer presence can lead to higher motivation and better test performance (e. g. Falk/Ichino 2006; Mas/Moretti 2009). This is a further reason why the participants' test results should not be interpreted as being equal to their performance in real life. However, as peer effects are relevant for participants with regard to both clean and less clean sets they should not distort a comparison between the two groups.
A third concern is the extent to which our sample of consumers and cashiers is representative of the Dutch and the German population. A strong point of the recruitment strategy was that we directly asked potential candidates to participate in our experiments instead of making general announcements and waiting for volunteers. The willingness to participate was very high. This was partly because the topic was interesting (coming into contact with real counterfeit money), and partly because the tests were conducted at a 'convenient' moment. Cashiers were asked to participate during working hours with the permission of their managers while consumers were contacted mostly during their leisure time. This might mitigate self-selection problems common to most experimental studies. A weak point of the recruitment strategy, however, was that around half of the consumers were contacted at locations or events of the two central banks. By doing so, it was easier to fulfil the banks' security regulations with regard to the handling of large amounts of money (more than 50,000 € in total) andmore importantlycounterfeit notes during the tests. However, the approach might have led to a certain preselection of candidates: the volunteers might be more interested in financial topics than the average citizen. Therefore, candidates in our sample might be better at distinguishing counterfeit and genuine banknotes than the wider population. Yet, as clean and less clean test sets are equally affected by this bias, we are still confident that the results of a comparison between the two can be transferred to the population as a whole.
3 Empirical strategy
Hypotheses
For the empirical analysis of the experiments, we formulate three hypotheses that follow the ECB's argumentation on the optimum level of banknote quality to combat counterfeits (ECB Decision 2010/14). The basic idea is that in a clean circulation, security features are more clearly visible.
The first hypothesis establishes a general relationship between banknote cleanliness and counterfeit detection.
H1: Respondents detect more counterfeits in a clean banknote circulation than in a less clean banknote circulation.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 describe how the relationship between banknote circulation and counterfeit detection might operate.
H2: A clean circulation makes it easier for respondents to distinguish between counterfeit and genuine banknotes. 6 H3: In a clean banknote circulation, respondents are more suspicious and tend to declare more banknotes to be counterfeits.
Our participants differ widely in terms of their sociodemographic characteristics. We therefore also ask whether personal characteristics, such as age, are relevant for their counterfeit detection performance. The results can help to identify vulnerable groups of the population who should be targeted by future education campaigns on counterfeit detection.
Measures of respondents' performance in counterfeit detection
When a respondent examines a banknote in the test set, four outcomes are possible. If the respondent examines a counterfeit banknote, he or she can either correctly classify the banknote as counterfeit (hit), or incorrectly classify the counterfeit as genuine (miss).
If the respondent examines a genuine banknote, he or she can either correctly classify the banknote as genuine (correct reject) or incorrectly classify the banknote as counterfeit (false alarm).
Based on these four combinations, we calculate different performance measures as outcome variables for our regression analysis. 7 In order to test H1, we follow previous research by Klein et al. (2004) and use the respondents' hit rate as the outcome variable. The hit rate (or detection rate) uses information on hits and misses and is simply defined as the number of hits divided by the total number of counterfeits in the test set (20) . By comparing the hit rates of candidates with clean test sets and less clean test sets, we can learn whether there is a general relationship between banknote cleanliness and counterfeit detection. However, we cannot tell whether the relationship is caused by better sorting accuracy (H2) or greater suspicion (H3).
To make a decision on H2 and H3, we must also consider a respondent's correct rejects and false alarms. Klein et al. (2004) and Jonker et al. (2006) calculate a false alarm rate (number of false alarms divided by the total number of genuine banknotes in the test set). If respondents with higher hit rates also have lower false alarm rates, we could conclude that the sorting was done more accurately. If, by contrast, the higher hit rate goes hand in hand with more false alarms, then the respondent was simply more suspicious. This kind of reasoning has been statistically operationalised by 'signal detection theory' (SDT), which has been applied in the field of psychophysics for decades. 8 The two basic elements of the theory are sensitivity and response bias. Sensitivity is the ability to distinguish between counterfeits and genuine banknotes (H2). The response bias describes the general tendency to answer yes or no in a yes/no task. Applied to our experiment, this is the tendency to declare a banknote as counterfeit (H3).
7 The terms used for the four outcomes are derived from the terminology of signal detection theory described later in this section. 8 See Stanislaw and Todorov (1999) for an extensive discussion. Different measures of sensitivity and response bias have been suggested in the literature. The two prevalent measures for sensitivity are known in the literature as A′ and d′. Response bias is operationalised with the measures β and c. All of these measures are functions of the hit rate and the false alarm rate, as described above. Their formulas are given in the electronic appendix C. The actual values of these four measures do not have a simple intuitive interpretation. Except for A′, the measures are parametric, i. e. they are based on the assumption that to a respondent, the 'signals' of both genuine and counterfeit banknotes are normally distributed with the same variance but with different means. The corresponding dimension could be called 'counterfeit resemblance' or 'counterfeit obviousness'. The location parameters of the signals along this dimension axis are specific to the individual. In other words, both signals are normally distributed but each individual perceives them in a specific way and then decides accordingly. A respondents' ability to separate the counterfeit signal from the genuine signal is referred to as the individual's sensitivity.
If a person cannot differentiate at all between genuine and counterfeit banknotes, the two distributions have the same meanin other words, they overlap completely. For a person who does not make any mistakes (no misses or false alarms), there is no overlap in the distributions, which is equivalent to saying that their means are very far apart. Following these considerations, the sensitivity measure d′ gives the distance between the means of the two distributions.
An overlap between the two distributions means that there are a number of cases where the individual is not sure whether a banknote is genuine or counterfeit. In such cases, some people tend to say that the banknote in question is counterfeit, which results in a high hit rate, but also a large number of false alarms. Others tend to say that the banknote is genuine, which maximises the number of correct rejects, but also produces several misses. This tendency is called bias. The former type of person is said to have a liberal criterion, while the latter type has a conservative criterion. β and c both measure the position of this criterion with respect to a neutral point, where the standard scores of the probabilities for hits are the same as the standard scores for the probabilities for false alarms. c gives the distance from the criterion to the neutral point in standard deviation units, while β is a likelihood ratio.
A′ is a non-parametric measure of sensitivity, i. e. no assumptions are made about the distribution of genuine and counterfeit banknotes along the 'counterfeit resemblance' scale. The main driver of A′ is the distance between the hit rate and the false alarm rate. The larger it is, the larger A′ is. When an individual is not able to differentiate between counterfeit and genuine notes, the hit rate and the false alarm rate will be the same. One example is a person who declares all banknotes to be counterfeits. This person has a hit rate and a false alarm rate of one. The difference between the two rates is zero, thus indicating that the person is not able to discriminate between the two types of banknotes. In that case, A′ takes on its lowest possible value. A′ is at its maximum when the hit rate is one and the false alarm rate is zero.
In performance tests, A′ and c as well as β and d′ can only be used pairwise, respectively. The pairs are equivalent from a methodological perspective. In this paper, we use A′ as a measure of sensitivity and c to capture response bias. 9 They are calculated on the level of the individual, i. e. we end up with one value for each of the two measures and for each participant. The parametric measure c is not defined when the hit rate and/or the false alarm rate are zero or one. Therefore, we set the maximum hit rate to 0.975 and the minimum false alarm rate to 0.025. 10, 11 The logical relationship between the different performance measures can also be illustrated in a correlation table. Table 1 presents the correlation matrix for A´, d´, beta, c, the detection rate and the false alarm rate for our sample. The two sensitivity measures A' and d' as well as the two bias measures c and β naturally show a very strong positive correlation as they measure the same dimension of detection performance. Furthermore, there is a strong positive correlation between detection rate and sensitivity on the one hand and a strong negative correlation between detection and bias on the other. As explained 9 For an analysis using β and d´please see the electronic appendix D.
10 The caps must not be any closer to 1/0 to avoid violating the normality assumption underlying the various signal detection theory measures. 45.4 % of our respondents, who have 4 or less false alarms and thus a false alarm rate of below 0.025, are affected by the cap. The cap on the hit rate only affects respondents who have a hit rate of exactly one (26.6 % of respondents). 11 Hit rates of zero (i. e. no counterfeit banknotes are detected) and false alarm rates of one (i. e. all genuine banknotes are classified as counterfeits) do not occur in the dataset.
above, a high detection rate can either be the result of a good ability to recognize a counterfeit or a strong tendency to call a banknote a counterfeit.
Regression analysis
We estimate several linear regression models with the individual i as the level of observation. Each model is in the form
In order to test H1, H2 and H3, the dependent variable y is defined as hit rate, sensitivity (A′) or response bias (c), respectively. The main explanatory variable, clean, is an indicator variable which assumes the value of one if the respondent has a clean set and the value of zero if the participant has a less clean set during the test. The matrix X contains several individual-specific variables: age, gender, level of education, his/her preferred method of payment (cash, cashless or both), whether the respondent is a professional cashier, whether the respondent was impaired by any visual handicaps during the test (any kind of handicap according to their own judgement), whether the respondent had checked banknotes for authenticity in the last six months and a country indicator (Dutch/German). α 0 is a constant, α 1 is a coefficient, γ is a vector of coefficients and ε i is an error term. In the regression testing H1 and H2, we expect α 1 to be positive. If H3 holds, α 1 will be negative. In an alternative version of the model, we will also allow the marginal effect of clean to differ for cashiers and consumers by including an interaction term.
As the assignment of the test sets was completely random, clean should in theory be an exogenous variable and a univariate analysis should already give us a causal effect. Nevertheless, we decided to conduct a multivariate analysis for two reasons: first, it is the more conservative method if randomness is violated and candidates with clean sets and less clean sets differ in characters that determine counterfeit detection. Second, the inclusion of socio-economic control variables offers interesting insights into the public's ability to detect counterfeits.
The regression analysis is based on an OLS estimation. Since two of our dependent variables, hit rate and sensitivity, can take on values between (and including) zero and one, fractional response models might also be appropriate. This is particularly true as we have a high share of respondents with a hit rate of exactly one. In a robustness check, fractional logit and probit estimations of eq. (1) produce virtually the same results as the linear model (see the electronic appendix E). We opt for the linear model because it is the more reliable model when standard errors are not identically and independently distributed. We calculate clustered standard errors at the set level to account for the fact that respondents who sort the same test sets might have more similar results.
Each regression is run separately. As our regression equations are all based on the same sample and contain the same explanatory variables, errors are correlated across equations and an estimation in a system (SUR) would enhance efficiency. However, this approach requires standard errors to be independent across individuals which, in our case, is violated because they are clustered at the level of sets. Therefore, we decided to treat equations as independent and estimate clustered standard errors.
Sample and descriptive statistics
The overall quality of the data derived from the tests is very good. Missing or ambiguous answers were clarified during the interview. For the few inconsistencies remaining, we make simple imputations. 12
Consumers
Descriptive statistics for the consumer sample can be found in Table 2 , column 1. 250 consumers were interviewed in total. Respondents performed quite well during the tests: the average detection rate was 79 % and the false alarm rate was 8 %. In the study by Jonker et al. (2006) , Dutch consumers attained a hit rate of 92 % and a false alarm rate of 14 %. However, the test settings differ significantly. First, half of the respondents in the latter study received training on counterfeit detection before starting the test. Second, they needed more time (up to 15 seconds) to examine the banknotes and were allowed to use an electronic checking device. Third, the test was split into three rounds and participants were informed about the percentage of correct answers after each round. Non-trained consumers identified 83 % of counterfeits in the first test round, which is close to our own results.
The sensitivity and bias measures A′ and c do not have a simple intuitive interpretation. However, some general observations are possible. A′ usually lies between 0.5 and 1, where 1 indicates a perfect performance. The average A′ of consumers is over 0.9, which implies that respondents do very well in distinguishing counterfeits from genuine banknotes. The bias measure c may be both positive and negative, with zero as the neutral point. A positive value implies a tendency to answer 'no', i. e. not to declare a banknote as being a counterfeit. In other words, respondents apply a conservative criterion and only call a banknote a counterfeit when they are fairly confident that they are right. The average time required per banknote was 6.29 seconds, which is close to the 6 seconds we indicated as the time that should suffice to recognise a counterfeit. However, further analysis shows that the time needed per banknote varied widely, from 1.9 to 17.0 seconds, and it markedly decreased from stack to stack. With regard to sociodemographic factors, our sample of consumers comprises more males and more persons with an above-average level of education compared to the population in Germany and the Netherlands as a whole. There are an equal number of German and Dutch participants. Only a small minority of consumers (14 %) have recently checked banknotes for authenticity. In the tests, they checked 2.43 security features on average. This is in accordance with the number of security features spontaneously mentioned by Dutch respondents (between 1.9 and 2.6) in the biennial studies about knowledge and appreciation of euro banknotes (Randsdorp/Zondervan 2015) . In theory, this should be sufficient to follow the ECB's advice always to check multiple security features.
Cashiers
Column 2 of Table 2 shows summary statistics for the cashier sample. Columns 3 and 4 show the results of t-tests and chi-squared tests on whether the summary statistics significantly differ between cashiers and consumers. In total, 261 cashiers were interviewed in our study -106 in the Netherlands and 155 in Germany. The cashiers were significantly quicker and better at detecting counterfeits than consumers. The hit rate was 88 % and the false alarm rate only 5 %. Again, the cashiers' performance was worse than in the study by Jonker et al. (2006) (see the discussion in Section 4.1). The average of the sensitivity measure A′ was higher for cashiers than for consumers, which implies that they were better at distinguishing between counterfeit and genuine banknotes. The bias measure c indicates that in case of doubt, cashiers were more prone to call a banknote a genuine banknote rather than a counterfeit, just as consumers are.
In contrast to consumers, the cashiers were significantly younger, the proportion of females was significantly higher and their average (completed) level of education level was significantly lower. However, many cashiers in the retail business are young people studying at university, who have not yet reached the final level of education that they are aiming for. The preference for cash as a payment instrument was about the same as for consumers (23 % vs. 24 %), but 37 % of consumers and only 29 % of cashiers prefer cards.
Most cashiers have checked banknotes in the last six months. However, some of them have not checked them manually, only using banknote authentication devices. The average number of security features checked was slightly higher for cashiers than for consumers. Table 3 shows summary statistics distinguishing between candidates with clean sets (column 1) and candidates with less clean sets (column 2) as well as the results of t-tests and chi-squared tests on whether the statistics significantly differ between the two groups (columns 3 and 4). The table provides initial evidence that the cleanliness of banknotes does actually play a role when it comes to detecting counterfeits. The hit rate was significantly higher in the clean sets (0.86) than in the less clean sets (0.82). However, the clean sets also show a significantly higher rate of false alarms (0.07 vs 0.06). Thus, more counterfeits were detected in the clean sets, but more genuine banknotes were also incorrectly declared as being counterfeits. As for A′, differences between clean and less clean sets were small or non-existent. The average value of c is lower in the clean sets, which points towards a tendency to declare more banknotes as being counterfeits when the cleanliness of the circulation is high. The average sorting time was similar in both types of sets. The sociodemographic profile of participants sorting the clean and less clean sets is similar with two exceptions: in the clean sets there is a significantly higher share of candidates without a secondary education and with visual handicaps. Table 4 shows the regression output for eq. (1) with the hit rate as a dependent variable. Column 1 presents the results of a univariate analysis that only comprises clean as an explanatory variable. Column 2 presents the results of a multivariate analysis with the control variables contained in X. In column 3 we allow the effect of clean to differ between cashiers and consumers by including an interaction term. In both the univariate and the multivariate regression, the coefficient of clean is positive and significant at the 5 % level. Having a clean set raises candidates' hit rates by an average of 4 percentage points. Relative to the Column 3 provides p-values of a two-sided t-test on whether the sample means of the continuous variables in the clean and the less clean sample are the same. Column 4 provides p-values of a chi-squared test on whether the distribution of the indicator variables in the clean and the less clean samples are the same.
Descriptive statistics on the level of sets and stacks

Counterfeit Detection
average detection rate of 84 %, this corresponds to a 5 % rise. Thus, there is a positive relationship between banknote quality and counterfeit detection (H1). The coefficients of the covariates show some further interesting results. German candidates detect more counterfeit banknotes than Dutch consumers. The reason for this might be that participants in Germany and the Netherlands were recruited in different ways. In Germany, most of the consumers were interviewed during events organised by the Deutsche Bundesbank, such as at an 'Open Day' or during Bundesbank presentations targeted at the general public. As a result, German participants might have an above-average level of interest in central banking topics. The age of the respondent has a significant negative effect on the hit rate. The older the person, the fewer counterfeits he or she detects. Our model predicts that a 25 year old candidate with otherwise average characteristics (sample means) will find 90.6 % of all counterfeits, while a 65 year old candidate will detect only 75.3 %.
The variables indicating a candidate's secondary education show no significant effect. This is surprising as one would expect these variables to be a good proxy for the candidate's cognitive skills and thus should be positively correlated with the detection rate. One possible explanation for the missing effect is that we lack information on income which is highly correlated with education but might itself have a negative effect on the detection rate: people with a higher income might not be too worried about a potential financial loss resulting from accepting a counterfeit banknote and are therefore less well informed about how to recognise counterfeit banknotes.
As for payment behaviour, candidates who prefer to pay by cashless means have a higher hit rate than those who predominantly use cash. This comes as a surprise as one would expect candidates who regularly handle banknotes to be more familiar with them and consequently perform better in the tests. One possible explanation for the unexpected correlation pattern is unobserved heterogeneity among participants, such as cognitive abilities. High cognitive skills are probably helpful in detecting counterfeits. At the same time, a study by Von Kalckreuth et al. (2014) establishes a correlation between cash usage and lower cognitive skills.
Having checked banknotes in the last six months increases the hit rate. This is either because these candidates must dispose of some kind of knowledge on how to identify counterfeits or because these candidates are more suspicious by nature and sort out more banknotes.
Surprisingly, we find no significant effect in terms of whether a candidates is a professional cashier or not, even though on a descriptive basis, the difference in hit rates was rather pronounced (see Table 2 ). A more detailed analysis shows that in the regression, the effect of the indicator variable for cashiers is entirely captured by the indicator showing whether the candidate has recently checked banknotes for authenticity. Apparently, handling banknotes regularly does not per se give cashiers an advantage when it comes to detecting counterfeits. The decisive factor appears to be that during their work they consciously examine the banknotes they handle.
In column 3 we also allow the effect of clean to differ between cashiers and consumers by including an interaction term. The coefficient of the interaction term is very small and insignificant. 13 It would appear that a clean banknote circulation does not help cashiers to detect counterfeits any more than it does for consumers.
H2: sensitivity
In a next step, we investigate whether banknote cleanliness affects participants' sensitivity A' ( Table 5 ). The coefficient of cleanliness is not significant, neither in the univariate regression (column 1) nor in the multivariate regression (column 2). 13 This result also holds if we estimate a model that only contains indicators for clean, cashier and the interaction term between the two variables.
Thus, having a clean set does not help in distinguishing genuine banknotes from counterfeits (contradicting H2). As can be seen from the interacted regression in column 3, this result holds for both consumers and cashiers. 14 Interestingly, all explanatory variables besides cleanliness have a similar effect on sensitivity as they do on the hit rate: being young, German, preferring card payments, checking banknotes for authenticity and having no visual impairment significantly increases sensitivity. Table 6 shows the regression results with the bias measure c as the dependent variable. As can be seen from the negative coefficients of the clean set indicator in both the univariate (column 1) and multivariate regression (column 2), clean banknotes reduce participants' bias measure c. This result holds for consumers and cashiers alike (column 3). In accordance with H3, they become more suspicious when the set is clean and are more likely to declare a banknote a counterfeit in case of doubt. 15 14 Using the alternative sensitivity measure d′ as a dependent variable leads to very similar results with regard to both sign and significance of the estimated coefficients (see the electronic appendix D). 15 Again, using an alternative bias measure β instead yields largely the same results (see the electronic appendix C).
H3: bias
As brand new banknotes are often mistaken for counterfeits they appear to be an important driver of the strong bias in the clean sets. Their false alarm rate is 14.7 % versus 5.8 % for the remaining, less clean banknotes. 16 The answers in the 16 The difference between the two rates is statistically significant at the one percent level based on a two-sided t-test (p = 0.000).
questionnaire on the candidates' testing strategy suggest that the 'feel' of the brand new banknotes is the decisive characteristic which raises suspicion. As for the socio-economic control variables, older participants apply a more conservative criterion. Older adults are known to very much dislike making errors (Starns/Ratcliff 2010) . What that means depends on what they perceive as the most important error. Since there were far fewer counterfeits than genuine notes in the test sets, they may have considered a false alarm to be the most embarrassing error, which could have led to the conservative bias for older adults.
Candidates who have recently checked banknotes for authenticity have a lower bias measure c. This is as expected because candidates who are more inclined to check banknotes in real life should also be more suspicious during the tests. Professionals are no more suspicious than consumers (even if we leave out the indicator for recent banknote checks).
Conclusions and recommendations
The purpose of this study was to improve knowledge about the effect of cleanliness of the banknote circulation on counterfeit detection. We tested 250 consumers and 261 cashiers from the Netherlands and Germany, using eight different test sets of two different cleanliness levels, each consisting of 20 counterfeits and 180 genuine banknotes. The empirical analysis of the experiment was based on four different performance measureshit rate, false alarm rate, sensitivity and biaswhich allowed us to draw a differentiated picture of the relationship between cleanliness and counterfeit detection.
As a first measure, we studied the testees' hit rate, which is the proportion of correctly selected counterfeits. The average hit rate for consumers was 79 %, and 88 % for cashiers. Conducting a regression analysis, we find that hit rates are on average 5 % higher when the sorted banknotes are clean. These results suggest that there is indeed a positive relationship between banknote cleanliness and the detection of counterfeits.
However, the high detection rates in the clean sets of our sample are accompanied by a large number of false alarms. This leads to two further questions: did the clean banknotes actually make it easier for the candidates to distinguish between counterfeit and genuine banknotes? Or did they only raise the suspicion of the candidates, who then declared more banknotes to be counterfeits, correctly or not?
To answer these questions, we adopted two concepts from signal detection theory. The measure of sensitivity describes the ability to distinguish between genuine and counterfeit banknotes. The measure of bias shows a candidate's tendency to be more or less suspicious about genuineness in general. Our results suggest that cleanliness does not help to increase sensitivity but rather drives up bias: people are generally more suspicious when the average cleanliness of banknotes is good.
When transferred to real life, our results suggest that high sorting standards can indeed increase counterfeit detection rates in the economy. In our tests, consumers and cashiers alike detected more counterfeits when the surrounding banknotes were clean. With high sorting standards, more counterfeit banknotes could be detected at the cash desks. However, our results also show that better sorting standards do not help the public to actually distinguish between counterfeit and genuine banknotes. The higher detection rates in the clean sets are rather the consequence of the testees' being more suspicious towards new banknotes in general. Thus, in real life, raising sorting standards also has an important drawback: consumers and cashiers are inclined to examine banknotes more closely, which increases transaction costs and in some cases might even lead to embarrassing situations at the cash desk. Furthermore, there is a risk that hit rates will go down again if people adapt to higher sorting standards and become less and less suspicious towards new and clean banknotes. Because of this trade-off, our results do not allow us to make any clear-cut recommendations regarding sorting standards. In addition, substantial costs can arise from replacing more sorted banknotes with new ones. Ultimately, the optimal level of banknote quality in each euro area country will depend on the specific counterfeiting rates, sorting costs, and the public's general expectations regarding the quality of banknotes.
As a further result, we find that brand new banknotes are often mistaken for counterfeits. According to our observations during the tests and comments made by the respondents in the questionnaires, this is mainly caused by the 'feel' of such banknotes. A possible recommendation from our study is therefore to carefully consider the feel of the banknote and the changes in tactile features of the banknotes when decisions about the material and coating of future banknotes are made. Nevertheless, further research on the determinants of bias in counterfeit detection is needed.
Furthermore, the age of the participants is found to be significant in most of our analyses. Older people detect fewer counterfeits and are less sensitive. At the same time, various studies on payment behaviour show that older people use cash more often (see, for example, Deutsche Bundesbank 2015: 32 f.). We therefore recommend developing information material targeted at older members of society and considering the needs of the elderly when developing new banknote designs and security features.
